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1.  Motivations 
2.  Genomic Background 
4.  Disease risk test 
5.  Evaluation on Real Data 
The human genome has approximately 3 billion letters. 
• Intel Core i7-2620M CPU with 2.70 GHz 
processor. 
• Size of the security parameter: 4096 bits. 
• Real SNP profiles from 1000 Genomes Project. 
• Coronary artery disease (CAD) risk factors (23 
SNPs, 14 non-genomic factors). 
• Java implementation. 
• Revelation of predisposition 
to diseases, ethnicity, 
paternity, filiation, etc. 
• Genetic discrimination. 
• Denial of access to health 
insurance, mortgage, 
education, and employment. 
 Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs): DNA 
variations, occurring when a single nucleotide 
differs between members of the same species. 
 Potential nucleotides for a SNP position are 
called alleles. 
 A disease risk test is done by analyzing 
particular SNPs along with other non-genomic 
risk factors. 
 Each SNP contributes to the disease risk in a different amount.  
 40 million approved SNPs in the human population. 
 Each patient carries around 4 million SNPs out of 40 million – real SNPs of the 
patient. 
 75 real SNPs enable the attacker to identify a person. 
BIO-BANK 
• Genomic data provides opportunities for substantial improvements in 
diagnosis and preventive medicine.  
• Individual’s predisposition to disease depends on genomic variations. 
• Non-genomic attributes of individuals also contribute significantly to 
their disease risks. 
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(1.b) Clinical data 
(2) Encrypted variants 
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CERTIFIED 
INSTITUTION (CI) 
MEDICAL UNIT (MU) 
STORAGE AND 
PROCESSING UNIT (SPU) 
PATIENT (P) 
GOALS: 
• Protect the privacy of patients’ genomic data and non-genomic data on a 
centralized bio-bank. 
• Allow different health stakeholders to access only to the medical data they 
need (or they are authorized for). 
• Allow different health stakeholders to perform some computations on the 
encrypted data in a privacy-preserving fashion in a reasonable time. 
Complexity of the Proposed System 
Encryption Storage Computation of disease risk 
380 ms./attribute  
(with pre-computed values: 
0.168 ms./attribute) 
51.2 GB 
per patient 
Computation of 
the genetic risk 
Privacy-preserving 
integer comparison 
Computation of the final 
risk 
230 sec  
(23 SNPs) 
3.390 sec  
(3 comparisons) 
140 sec 
 (14 environmental factors) 
Total: 373.432 sec 
E. Ayday, J. L.Raisaro, P. J. McLaren, J. Fellay, and J.-P. Hubaux. Privacy-Preserving Computation of Disease Risk by Using Genomic, Clinical, and Environmental Data. USENIX Security Workshop on Health Information Technologies (HealthTech '13), Aug. 2013.  
Web link: http://lca.epfl.ch/projects/genomic-privacy/ 
3.  Proposed Framework 
CURIOUS 
PARTY 
MALICIOUS 
PARTY 
𝜷𝑮 = 𝜷𝟏 𝟏 − 𝑮 𝑺, 𝒃𝟏 +  𝜷𝒊 𝑮 𝑺, 𝒃𝒊−𝟏 − 𝑮 𝑺, 𝒃𝒊 + 𝜷𝒌𝑪 𝑺, 𝒃𝒌−𝟏
(𝒌−𝟏)
𝒊=𝟐
 
𝑷 𝒅𝒊𝒔𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒆 =  
𝒆𝜷𝒇 
𝟏 + 𝒆𝜷𝒇
  
 [𝜷𝒇] = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝑮 + 𝜷 𝒊𝑵𝒊
𝒎
𝒊=𝟏
 
A.   GENETIC RISK COMPUTATION THROUGH A PRIVATE LOGISTIC REGRESSION MODEL 
. . . 
Markers for  
disease X 𝑆𝑁𝑃𝑖
𝑃 ∈
 0, 1, 2 : 
Patient (P)’s SNPs: 
Contributions  
of markers  
𝛽𝑖 = 𝑙𝑛(𝑂𝑅𝑖): 
𝑺𝑵𝑷𝒎−𝟏
𝑷   𝑺𝑵𝑷𝒎
𝑷   𝑺𝑵𝑷𝒎+𝟏
𝑷   . . . 𝑺𝑵𝑷𝒏𝑷  . . . 𝑺𝑵𝑷𝒌𝑷  . . . 
𝑺𝑵𝑷𝒌  𝑺𝑵𝑷𝒏  𝑺𝑵𝑷𝒎  
𝜷𝒎 𝜷𝒏 𝜷𝒌 
[𝑺] = 𝜶 +  𝜷𝒊 𝑺𝑵𝑷𝒊
𝑷(𝑿)
𝒊∈ 𝒎,𝒏,𝒌
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P’s genetic risk 
for disease X: 
β1 = ln(OR1) 
β2 = ln(OR2) β3 = ln(OR3) 
β4 = ln(OR4) 
b1 b2 b3 
25% 25% 25% 25% 
• For clinical use explanatory 
variables like the genetic risk 
should be categorized based 
on their risk group. 
• A private preserving 
comparison algorithm 
between SPU and MU allows 
to compare encrypted 
values. 
C.    FINAL DISEASE RISK COMPUTATION 
B.   GENETIC RISK CATEGORIZATION 
• Let ℕ = 𝑁1 , 𝑁2 , … , 𝑁𝑚  be the encrypted non-genomic attributes of the 
patients,  the final disease risk is computed as follows: 
• Let [G (S, bi)] be the encrypted result of the comparison between S  and bi  thus 
the encrypted genetic regression coefficient  𝛽𝐺  can be computed as follows: 
 
 G (S, bi)]= 1 ↔ S ≥ bi 
 
G (S, bi) = 0 ↔ S < bi 
PRIVACY THREATS DUE TO GENOMIC 
INFORMATION LEAKAGE: 
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